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Dating with Procrustes: 
Early Pramāṇavāda Chronology Revisited
Florin Deleanu 
Dating Indian philosophy almost invariably ends up in a Procrustean bed. Chronologies, 
whether traditional or modern, are not entirely absent, but they tend to be frustratingly 
approximate and bitterly controversial. The timeline of major events and figures in Indian 
Buddhism is no exception to this paradigm of haziness, probably the only certitude of the 
subcontinent’s historiography. The present essay ventures out into one of its chapters 
without hoping to dispel the fog. If anything, it will only stir it.   
In spite of dealing with topics related to Buddhist logic, this essay is not the product 
of a well-reasoned plan, let alone extensive expertise in the field. While tackling a 
different project, it became necessary to touch upon the dating of Dignāga, the man who 
found the Buddhist theory on knowledge a pile of mostly unpolished bricks and left it an 
elaborate edifice of logic (hetuvidyā) and epistemology (pramāṇavāda).1 Rather than 
simply copying Dignāga’s dates from a standard reference source, I thought a bit of fact 
checking wouldn’t do any harm. I couldn’t have been more wrong. Before I knew it, I 
was scribbling far too many a line for a mere footnote. And tinkering with Dignāga’s 
dates set off a chain reaction affecting the chronology of his successors. The more I looked 
into the details, the clearer it appeared that there is sufficient room for the revisitation of 
the timeline. Eventually, the footnote exploded into a long-though-far-from-
comprehensive essay on the early Pramāṇavāda chronology from the 4th to the 7th century. 
1 The famous Tibetan scholar Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (1290–1364) tells us that Vasubandhu’s pupil 
who proved himself sharper than his Master in matters of scholarly accomplishment (Obermiller 1996 
[1932], 149, renders ‘in the field of logic’) was Dignāga (dByig-gnyen gyi slob ma tshad ma rang bas 
mkhas pa dpal ldan Phyogs-kyi-glang-po ni | Chos-B, Chandra ed. #847 = Ya 108a3).  
Tāranātha (/Kun-dga'-snying-po) (1575-1634), the other bright star of the Tibetan historiography, 
includes Dignāga among the Six Jewels (rgyan drug) of the Buddhist Dharma. Together with 
Nāgārjuna (Tib. Klu-sgrub) and Asaṅga (Thogs-med), Dignāga (Phyogs-kyi-glang-po) is honoured 
with the title of ‘author of original treatises’ (gzhung byed pa po). These founders of philosophical 
systems, as we would call them nowadays, are paired with three authors of commentaries (’grel byed), 
or in modern parlance, exegetes refining and elaborating upon these systems: Āryadeva (Phags-pa-
lha), Vasubandhu (dByig-gnyen), and Dharmakīrti (Chos-kyi-grags-pa) (Chos-T p. 144, ll. 5-8; cf. 
Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 240; also cf. Eltschinger 2019a, 156).  
Dignāga’s place in the history of Indian philosophy goes beyond Buddhism. As Herzberger (1986) 
points out, ‘Indian logic had its origin in cross-currents between a grammarian, Bhartṛhari, and a 
Buddhist philosopher, Dignāga […]’ (p. XVII).  
11
Florin Deleanu 
Apart from the new hypothesis on Dignāga’s dates, I cannot claim much originality for 
the rest of the chronology. Nonetheless, I dare hope that some rambling thoughts might 
bear the light of day without over-taxing the patience of the intrepid reader.  
Dignāga 
The hypothesis I put forward is that Dignāga lived between c. 430 and 500.2 I have no 
doubt that Procrustes will find more than one scholar willing to wield his/her hammer and 
crush the legs of my conjectures and stretch the backbone of my assumptions. Risky as it 
may be, let me tell you why I beg to differ from the widely accepted dating of 480-540. 
The latter largely owes its dominant place in modern Buddhist studies to Erich 
Frauwallner’s ‘Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic’ (1982 [1961], 856-858). The 
study is itself a landmark in our understanding of the complex chronology of late Indian 
Buddhism but, dare I say, here and there some tweaking is possible.  
Some of Frauwallner’s main arguments do hold: Dignāga should be placed between 
Vasubandhu and Dharmapāla. Furthermore, the Buddhist logician cites or refers to the 
work of Bhartṛhari (Frauwallner 1982 [1961], 759-841). This means that either the two 
were contemporaneous or Dignāga was active after Bhartṛhari. Frauwallner’s dating of 
‘the younger Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharmakośaḥ’ (ibid. 853) to about 400-
480 and of Bhartṛhari to 450-510 led him to surmise that Dignāga must be placed between 
480 and 540.  
The two Vasubandhu-theory has proved rather unpopular over the years, but the 
400-480 hypothesis has had a substantial impact on dating Vasubandhu and other
Buddhist philosophers following him. To be sure, Frauwallner has not been alone in 
arguing for these dates. Other leading scholars have also suggested a similar timeline.3 
In spite of the wide-spread acceptance of the 400-480 hypothesis, I have argued – 
cautiously and conjecturally – that dating Vasubandhu to c. 350-430 appears a better, 
albeit not exactly waterproof, scenario (see Deleanu 2006, 186-194).  
I am not the only or the first student of Indian Buddhism to do so (see Katō 1987). 
My hypothesis was inspired by earlier contributions,4 first and foremost by a seminal 
study published by Lambert Schmithausen in 1992. The German doyen of Yogācāra 
studies points out two passages from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra which cite from or at least 
2 I am not the first one to argue for an earlier dating. Ui (1929, 142-145; 1958, 3), for instance, places 
Dignāga between 400 and 480. Similarly, Nakamura 1989 [1980], 296 (also referring to earlier 
research on the topic, id. note 1) suggests 480-485.  
3 See, for instance, Hirakawa 1973, II-X, Hirakawa 1979, 229. This remains the most widely accepted 
dating in Japanese Buddhist studies.  
4 Other scholars, working independently, had also dated Vasubandhu to or around 350-430 (for more 
details, see Deleanu 2006, 193).  
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presuppose Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā. Since they also appear in the first extant Chinese 
translation of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which is dated to 443, it means that Vasubandhu must 
have written his magnum opus earlier (by probably at least one or two decades).  
Another argument I adduced was the fact that the Indian chronology of the Gupta 
kings with whom Vasubandhu’s name is traditionally associated is far from clear. It is 
anyway much less precise than Frauwallner’s study would let us believe. There are quite 
a few ways to read the historical and epigraphical materials of the epoch, but my 
conjecture is that that the two kings in question can be identified as Candragupta II (r. 
375-413/415) and Kumāragupta (r. 413/415-455).
These arguments alongside the lineage of Indian dharmācāryas appended to the
Chinese translation of Vajrarṣi’s commentary upon the *Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā-
śāstra 金剛仙論 (T 25.874c9-24) suggest the possibility of dating Vasubandhu to c. 
350-430. The conclusion is admittedly based on many ifs but it is, I believe, a more likely
candidate than the 400-480 hypothesis.5
If so (another ‘if’!), then the dating of at least some other Buddhist figures 
connected to or post-Vasubandhu needs re-examining. This, of course, cannot be a 
mechanical process of lowering the dates by half a century for all later Buddhist authors. 
We need a careful case-by-case approach corroborated by relevant evidence and tallying 
with the timelines of other related figures and events. I am not prepared to tackle such a 
formidable task of Frauwallnerian or Lamottesque proportions in their impeccable 
manner, but I hope sharing a few iffy conjectures on Dignāga, Sthiramati, Bhāviveka, 
Dharmapāla, and Dharmakīrti will be condoned as a scholarly misdemeanour.  
*** 
A crucial point of reference in dating Dignāga is the famous grammarian and philosopher 
of language Bhartṛhari.6 There is no doubt that Dignāga was familiar with Bhartṛhari’s 
work, and some of his arguments appear meant to criticise the latter’s views. 7 
5 Since its publication, my hypothesis has been favourably mentioned in a few major Buddhological 
contributions, being supported or accepted as one possibility of dating Vasubandhu (e.g. Lodrö Sangpo 
2012, 166-167; Gold 2015, 18; Westerhoff 2018, 155 n. 22; and Kritzer 2019, 496).   
6 Bhartṛhari appears to have also been an accomplished poet, being traditionally considered the author 
of the Subhāṣitatriśatī. Whether we have to deal with a polymath or two persons sharing the same 
name or a false attribution remains a controversial issue (see Houben 1995, pp. 4-5 and n. 5).  
7 Dignāga’s familiarity with Bhartṛhari as well as the latter’s knowledge of Buddhism has been 
discussed in a number of seminal studies. To give just a few examples, see Iyenagar 1950, Nakamura 
1955, Frauwallner 1982 [1961], Hattori 1977, Hattori 1979, Herzberger 1986 (which is a monograph 
dedicated to the subject), Lindtner 1994 [1994], Kelly 1994 [1994] (especially 179-188), Bronkhorst 
2011, 108-117, etc. The central piece of evidence supporting Dignāga’s familiarity with Bhartṛhari’s 
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Frauwallner places Bhartṛhari life between 450 and 510, but this is far from certain. 
Bhartṛhari’s dates have equally been subject to intense scholarly debate. True, the dates 
proposed by Frauwallner still have supporters. Coward and Raja (1990, 120), for instance, 
assert that ‘[t]hese dates [i.e. 450-510] are accepted by most recent scholarship as the best 
we can currently do’. ‘Most recent scholarship’ is, however, a bit of an overstatement.  
The survey done by Cardona in 1976 (pp. 298-299) shows that quite a few 
hypotheses have been put forward. A number of authors actually argue for earlier dates in 
the 4th or even 3rd century. Cardona himself concludes that ‘it must be accepted that 
Bhartṛhari lived no later than the fifth century A.D.’ (ibid. 299). Similarly, Aklujkar (1993 
[1994], 21) maintains that Bhartṛhari should be placed ‘definitely not later than 425-450’, 
a view repeated in Aklujkar 1999 and supported by Wezler 2002, IX.8  
Dating the activity of the great grammarian to the first half of the 5th century is thus 
a possibility supported by some of the heavyweights of the field. In view of this, I would 
cautiously date Bhartṛhari to c. 380-450,9 observing thus the upper limit suggested by 
Aklujkar (1993, 1994). This would also account for what appears to be an allusion to 
Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (verses 1, 17, 18a) in the Vākyapadīya (Ch. I, verse 124) (see 
Lindtner 1993 [1994], 196).10  
If my dating of the Yogācāra Patriarch is correct and he wrote his magnum opus in 
his old age, as generally believed by both tradition and modern studies, then the Triṃśikā 
must have been authored sometime between 420 and 430. Bhartṛhari would have been 40 
or 50 years old. Unless an unusually gifted prodigy, he probably wrote the Vākyapadīya, 
a masterpiece of enormous subtlety and ingenuity, around or after this age.  
Another detail which we know from Chinese sources and is usually deemed to have 
credence is that Vasubandhu had a polemical exchange over his (recently authored?) 
work is the citation of two verses from the Vākyapadīya (Ch. II, verses 158 [p. 76] and 155 [p. 75]) in 
the Pramāṇasamuccaya (Ch. V, 147, 149). More examples of parallelism are discussed in Herzberger 
1986 and Lindtner 1994 [1993] 200-202.  
8 More cautious authors like Houben 1995, 5, simply state that Bhartṛhari must have lived ‘some two 
centuries earlier’ than early 7th century (the date suggested by Yijing). Beyond that, he adds, ‘[a] 
definite date cannot be given’ (Houben 1995, 5 n. 7, also referring to Iyer 1969).  
The Chinese scholar-monk and translator Yijing 義淨 refers to Bhartṛhari 鉢顛社攞 in the 
Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan 南海寄歸内法傳, an account of his journey to India and Southeast Asia. 
According to him, Bhartṛhari was a contemporary of the Dharmācārya Dharmapāla即是護法師之同
時人也 (T 54.229a24). The latter is usually (and less controversially) dated to c. 530-561 (for more 
details, see below). Mid- to late 6th century is indeed much later than all other sources suggest.  
9 The choice of a 70-year lifespan will be explained below.  
10 For the critical edition of the former text, see Buescher ed. 2007, pp. 40-48, 108, 110. For the latter, 
see Rau ed. 2002, p. 28.  
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Abhidharmakośa with Vasurāta, Bhartṛhari’s master. 11  According to my conjectural 
dating, the Abhidharmakośa must have seen the light of day when Vasubandhu was 
around 30 or 40 years old, i.e. sometime between 380 and 390. This might also be the 
date of the debate between these two Masters. The timeframe surmised here could thus 
accommodate this as well as other pieces of the admittedly blurry testimony on which we 
have to rely.  
*** 
Dignāga is generally dated later than Bhartṛhari. Frauwallner and most scholars following 
this hypothesis place the grammarian 30 years earlier than the Buddhist logician. As far 
as I know, there is no clear evidence to suggest this, but in the absence of other clues, it 
can be taken as a methodologically acceptable presupposition. Based on it as well as on 
dating Bhartṛhari to c. 380-450, we could speculate that Dignāga was born around 410. 
His early life would have thus overlapped with (what in my dating would be) the last two 
decades of Vasubandhu’s career.  
If that had indeed been the case, it would match an important detail in the account 
provided by the Tibetan historiography. According to both Bu-ston (Chos-B, Chandra ed. 
#847-848 = Ya 108a-108b; cf. Obermiller tr. 1996, 149ff.) and Tāranātha (Chos-T 102ff.; 
cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 182ff.), Dignāga studied under Vasubandhu.12 
Frauwallner (1982 [1961], 848) discards, however, the testimony offered by Bu-ston and 
Tāranātha qualifying it as ‘to a very great extent valueless’. To me, the judgement sounds 
rather harsh. True, their accounts were written many centuries after the events which they 
depict and their Indian sources are unclear.13 But there is no harm in giving them a chance 
11 See Frauwallner 1982, 857; Lindtner 1994 [1993] 195, etc. The Chinese source in question is the 
Posoupandou fashi zhuan or Biography of Dharmācārya Vasubandhu婆薮槃豆法師傳 (T 50.190b), 
transmitted and translated by the Indian scholar-monk Paramārtha 眞諦.  
12 The closest thing to a chronology in Yijing’s Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan is a list of Buddhist masters 
divided into old, middle, and recent periods. Dignāga’s name comes up in the generation of recent 
masters alongside Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Śīlabhadra, etc. placed after Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. 
(斯乃遠則龍猛、提婆、馬鳴之類。中則世親、無著、僧賢、清哲之徒。近則陳那、護法、法
稱、戒賢及師子月、安慧、徳慧、慧護、徳光、勝光之輩。T 54.229b14-17; my punctuation). The 
qualification ‘recent’ 近 is obviously too vague to allow a precise dating.   
Dignāga is also mentioned a couple times in Xuanzang’s 玄奘 Da Tang Xiyu ji (Records of the 
Western Regions) 大唐西域記 (T 51, No. 2087) as well as in his biography Dacien-si sanzang fashi 
zhuan 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳 (T 51, No. 2053), but neither contains clues for his dating. 
On Dignāga’s name and its translations into Chinese, phonetic and semantic, see He 2017. 
13 There are, however, modern scholars who have relied, entirely or partially, on the data provided by 
Bu-ston’s and Tāranātha. Stcherbatsky 1993 [1930-1932], for instance, discards the ‘mythological 
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and see whether their scenario might work within the timeframe I’ve surmised. 
     For the sake of argument, let us therefore suppose that Dignāga, still a teenager, 
studied under the septuagenarian Vasubandhu sometime between 420 and 430. Both 
Tibetan historiographers tell us, however, that Dignāga fist joined the Buddhist Order 
(rab tu byung) in the Vatsīputrīya school (gnas ma bu’i sde) (Chos-B, Chandra ed. #847 
= Ya 108a3-4; Chos-T p. 102, ll. 1-5). According to Bu-ston, he started his studies with 
the worldly disciplines of grammar, etc. (sgra la sogs pa tha snyad kyi gtsug lag; Chos-
B, Chandra ed. #847 = Ya 108a3). Tāranātha records that Dignāga became an expert in 
the Śrāvaka’s Tripiṭaka (nyan thos kyi sde snod gsum la mkhas par byed; Chos-T p. 102, 
l. 5) under the Vatsīputrīya Master Nāgadatta.14 Having grown dissatisfied with the 
Vatsīputrīya system and his teacher’s inability to dispel his philosophical doubts, Dignāga 
eventually went over to Vasubandhu, under whom he studied the Piṭakas of both the 
Greater and Lesser Vehicles (theg pa che chung) and became proficient in five hundred 
scriptures (mdo lnga brgya; Chos-T p. 102, l. 16).  
The impression one gets from this account is that Dignāga wasn’t exactly a teenager 
when he reached his dream master. Unless he was a Dharma child prodigy, these events 
would seem to depict a young man in his 20s, which wouldn’t match so neatly with the 
timeframe I’m suggesting. Of course, dates like 410 (Dignāga’s alleged birth) and 430 
(Vasubandhu’s death) should be taken as very approximate, in which case the pieces of 
the puzzle would more or less fit. The argument is, however, rather forced, and would 
make too weak a reason for setting Dignāga’s year of birth around 410.  
     Furthermore, there is one more reason to re-assess the traditional Tibetan 
chronology. Frauwallner (1982 [1961], 848-849) offers a methodological argument which 
I incline to support: ‘in course of time unimportant persons are forgotten and only the 
memory of really important personalities is preserved. […] If, therefore, a famous author 
is said to be the pupil of another famous man, it is a priori suspicious.’ ‘A priori’ is a bit 
of an overstatement, but all in all, the argument is applicable especially when no strong 
proof to the contrary can be adduced.  
I do not rule out entirely the possibility to establish a chronology on the basis of 
Bu-ston’s and Tāranātha’s scenarios, but here I shall follow in Frauwallner’s 
methodological footsteps and place Dignāga’s birth after Vasubandhu’s death assuming 
that the logician studied under a master whose name was forgotten by the tradition. If all 
these conjectures are acceptable, then Dignāga must have been born around 430.  
 
                                               
details’ in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s biographies transmitted by the two Tibetan historiographers, 
but argues that ‘there are however facts which with great probability must be assumed correct’ (p. 31).  
14  Tāranātha gives the Master’s name both in Sanskrit pronunciation (Nā-ga-datta) and Tibetan 
translation (Glang-po-byin ‘Elephant-given’) (Chos-T p. 102, l. 4).  
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*** 
How long did the great logician live? As far as I am aware of, there is no traditional hint 
to support a lifespan of 60 years (as put forward by Frauwallner and adopted by most 
scholars) or 80 years (as given by Ui 1929, 142-145; 1958, 3) or 85 years (as suggested 
by Nakamura 1989 [1980], 296). The latter two hypotheses are, I assume, patterned on 
the universally accepted lifespan of the historical Buddha. Nothing, however, warrants 
such a conjecture in Dignāga’s case. On the other hand, the 60 year-theory may owe its 
broader currency to a belief that it reflects more realistically the average life expectancy 
in ancient India. But does it?  
     I confess I haven’t looked deeply into the historical, anthropological, and biological 
research on the matter, but a preliminary biblio-cum-cyber-hunt hasn’t revealed any data 
on the lifespan in or around the Gupta period. One general fact that emerges is that the 
average lifespan in traditional societies, South Asia and elsewhere, was lower first and 
foremost on account of the extremely high rate of infant and child mortality. Other factors 
as the frequent incidence of epidemics, wars, famines, etc., the endemic poverty affecting 
large parts of the society, and the lack of efficient medical and socio-political response 
made matters far worse than in the modern era.15  
One thing which is certain in Dignāga’s case is that the logician – obviously! –
didn’t die in his childhood. Furthermore, no historical source mentions anything about an 
untimely death due to unnatural causes. Both Bu-ston and Tāranātha actually end their 
accounts with descriptions of the success which Dignāga had achieved in spreading the 
Dharma after an apparently long career. Tāranātha adds that the great ācārya passed away 
in a solitary forest (nags tshal dben pa) in *Oḍiviśa after devoting (the last part of?) his 
life to the twelve ascetic practices (sbyangs pa’i yon tan bcu gnyis; *dvādaśadhūtaguṇa) 
(Chos-T p. 105, ll.9-11).  
     To all intents and purposes, we can assume that Dignāga enjoyed at least an average 
lifespan. But how do we calculate it? Dates and chronologies in Indian history are 
notoriously approximate (if they can be reconstructed at all). Calculating the average 
lifespan from the few and highly conjectural dates of the lives of Indian Buddhists would 
be close to an exercise in fictive statistics.  
     The next-to-the-best alternative which I could figure out is to use data from the 
Chinese historiography. Standing at the antipole of the Indian paradigm, the Chinese 
                                               
15 The data discussed by Frier 2009, 788–789, shows that the average life expectancy of an Ancient 
Roman at birth was about 25 years, but if a person made it to 25, statistically he/she could expect a 
lifespan of 53 years. Similarly, and here the income factor also counts, an aristocrat in late mediaeval 
England could expect to live until the age of 64 if he/she survived until 21 (see Lancaster 1990, 8). 
See also Freeman Travers, 2007, with extensive data on similar situations in post-1500 England and 
some of the American Colonies. See also note 18 below.  
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civilisation is well-known for its meticulous and generally reliable record of historical 
events and dates. It is admittedly a non-professional guess, but as far as I know, racially-
dependant genetic factors do not have a substantial impact on the average life expectancy. 
I therefore assume that the statistical data found for one ethnical group (Chinese, in our 
case) can be applied with a reasonably small margin of error to another ethnical group 
(here, Indian) especially as both groups shared the same profession and arguably similar 
ways of life.16  
     I thus worked out the average yielded by the lifespans of 313 Chinese Buddhists 
recorded in the Chūgoku bukkyō-shi jiten or Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist History 
edited by the eminent Japanese scholar Kamata Shigeo (1981). Apart from a handful of 
lay followers, the sample includes mainly monastics covering a period from the second 
half of the 2nd century CE to the first half of the 20th century. In spite of the steady progress 
underlying this long period, by and large it represents, I believe, one single paradigm, i.e. 
the traditional lifestyle predating the advent of modern medicine and social services 
which have greatly contributed to the marked increase in life expectancy in our age.  
I have excluded from my sample all those figures whose dates are unknown 
(obviously!) or have a margin of uncertainty.17 I am aware, of course, that in quite a few 
                                               
16 True, there are environmental, dietary, epidemic-risk, etc. factors which could have influenced 
differently the average lifespans of the Buddhists living in India vs those living China. However, my 
guess (once again, admittedly uneducated) is that the impact of these differences was not dramatic, 
especially as both civilisations had the benefit of sophisticated systems of traditional medicine.  
17 Some of the monastics included in this sample are said to have enjoyed exceptional longevity. I 
haven’t excluded them as long as they were in the vicinity of 125 years. Several hypothesis concerning 
the calculation of maximum human life (which, needless to say, is different from the median lifespan) 
have been put forward. I adopt the 125± year model suggested by Weon and He 2009, corroborated 
by documented cases as Jeanne Louise Calment (1875-1997) who lived 122 years and 164 days. (For 
different hypotheses and methods of calculating the maximum human longevity, see Wikipedia, The 
Free Encyclopedia, s.v. ‘Maximum life span’, accessed 15 July 2019, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_life_span#In_humans)  
Apart from the hagiographical accounts stretching way beyond the 125± limit, the Buddhist 
tradition contains some believable cases of super longevity. The Chan monk Huian 慧安, for instance, 
is recorded to have lived between 582 and 708, i.e. 127 years (see Kamata 1981, 11, s.v. ‘Ean’). In the 
Tibetan tradition, the great adept (mahāsiddha) Thang-stong rGyal-po is said to have lived from 1361 
to 1485, reaching the venerable age of nearly 125 (see Shinga 2017).  
Interestingly, the traditional Indian view is that the natural, or rather God(s)-given, lifespan is 100 
years, a belief expressed as early as the Atharvaveda (3.11, pp. 36-37). The view is also found in 
Buddhist sources (e.g. Bodhisattvabhūmi p. 252, l. 20, which considers 100 years to be the maximum 
lifespan in our aeon: yaś ciraṃ jīvati, sa varṣaśatam). The overall picture is, however, more complex 
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cases the dating is controversial and open to re-examination. This, however, is a situation 
bound to continue for the foreseeable future, and the adjustments which need to be made 
will arguably have a moderate impact on the average lifespan of the figures included in 
this survey.  
All in all, I think this sample of 313 people can give us reasonably reliable data. 
The median lifespan which it yields is 68.9, or to round it off, 69 years. I would actually 
go one step further and suggest rounding off to 70. Why? Well, I don’t deny it: as this age 
bracket is starting to loom over me, I do want to give myself an extra year (and hope for 
more from modern medicine and social services). So, yes, there is a subjective note 
underlying this rounding off. But on the other hand, if I said that Dignāga lived from 430 
to 499, it would imply having clear evidence that he died at the age of 69.18 I trust 
therefore you will kindly indulge me with the hypothesis that the average life span of 
monk-scholars in traditional China and by extension India as well as other areas was about 
70 years.19  
By way of (very-cautious-cum-indulge-begging) conclusion, I would thus 
conjecture that the dates of Dignāga are c. 430-500.20  
 
Sthiramati 
Does this hypothesis disturb the post-Dignāga chronology advocated by Frauwallner? 
‘Disturb’ may be too strong a word, but tweaking here and there appears necessary. This 
is not only due to re-dating Dignāga but also called for by other historical reasons. Below 
we shall look into the timelines of some ācāryas whose lives and works were touched by 
Dignāga’s legacy one way or another. (Now, I get a feeling Procrustes is really getting 
                                               
largely due to the pessimistic idea of the five degeneracies (pañcakaṣāya) which adversely affect 
longevity in our aeon (more details are given in Shinga, forthcoming). Seen from this angle, the 
longevity hopes of the ancient and mediaeval Indians, hopes reinforced by their religious beliefs, 
would not have greatly differed from ours. Dying at 60, or for that matter at 70, was to them, as it is 
for us, ahead of the God(s)- or DNA-allotted time.  
18 Interestingly, the figure roughly matches similar data concerning Muslim scholars. While the 
general median lifespan in the Mediaeval Islamic world was 35+, the average for scholars was 59 to 
84.3 (it’s good to be a scholar!) (see Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. ‘Life Expectancy’, 
accessed 15 July 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_expectancy#cite_ref-28; the article bases its 
data on four studies). This gives us a median figure of 71.5 for the Muslim scholars, which is close to 
the 68.9 average obtained for Chinese Buddhist monastics.  
19 Tentatively, such a working hypothesis could be extended beyond the Buddhist fold to encompass 
scholars, contemplatives, etc. belonging to other religious groups.  
20 It goes without saying that choosing round figures like ‘430’ or ‘500’ has no basis in reality. It is a 




     Both Bu-ston (Chos-B, Chandra ed. #845-847 = Ya 107a6-108a3; cf. Obermiller tr. 
1996, 147-149) and Tāranātha (Chos-T 101-102.; cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 
1990, 179-181) describe Sthiramati as Vasubandhu’s disciple. If we follow the hypothesis 
advocated above, this would require dating him before Dignāga. Not all traditional 
accounts subscribe, however, to the Tibetan chronology. For instance, Ji基, Xuanzang’s 
foremost disciple and de facto founder of the Chinese Faxiang 法相 school, tells us that 
Sthiramati was Guṇamati’s pupil (T 43.231c17), a detail corroborated by the Uighur 
version of the Tattvārthā Abhidharmakośaṭīkā (see Kramer 2019, 456).  
Most modern scholars place Sthiramati after Vasubandhu. Frauwallner (1982 
[1961], 858-859) dates him to 510-570. 21  The Austrian scholar thus similarly 
presupposes one generation lapse between Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.22 As far as I can 
see, there is no reason preventing us from postulating an even longer period between the 
                                               
21 See Kramer 2019, for a state-of-the-art survey of Sthiramati’s life and work.  
22 Frauwallner as well as many, if not most, modern scholars conventionally set the interval between 
master and disciple to c. 30 years, a span usually associated with one generation. I do the same but 
with considerable scepticism regarding this mechanical way of establishing chronologies. The ground-
realities of the master-disciple age difference must have been as varied in ancient India as they are in 
our world. Suffice it to think of the modern academia: throughout their lives, teachers will impart 
knowledge to students younger than themselves by anything from 5 to 50 years or more, not to mention 
that some students can be the same or even older than their teacher.  
Furthermore, while ‘generation’ is a concept which is instrumental and quantifiable in genetics 
and biological anthropology, in humanities its meaning tends to get blurred. In the former disciplines, 
it measures the median time between parents and their offspring. Devine 2005, for instance, calculates 
that the interval for female lineages of descendants is 28.72 years while for male-line lineages it is 
31.13 years. This may seem to roughly tally with the 30-year interval used in Buddhist studies, but the 
problem is that a master-disciple relation is not a genetic one.  
In spite of my misgivings, I would, however, consider ‘unscientific’ to work with intervals shorter 
of longer than 30 years between master and disciple unless warranted by reliable evidence. Shortening 
or lengthening the interval could open the door to undue subjectivity making room for any span (5 to 
50 years!) necessary to accommodate one’s pet chronology. One solution would be to measure the 
median intervals between master and disciple in Chinese or other well-documented tradition, but here 
situations could vary far more than in the case of lifespans. It would be too wild a guess to extrapolate 
it to another tradition. Begrudgingly, I therefore see no other alternative than to work with the same 
30-year convention. As there is no solution I can offer here, the whole note may seem superfluous, but 
I believe the discussion serves to emphasise the mechanical counting which our timeline 
reconstructions are forced to embrace.  
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two Buddhist thinkers.23 For reasons which will become apparent below, Sthiramati’s 
death must be set around the middle of the 6th century. So when was the famous exegete 
born?  
The main clue is provided by the Dabao ji jing lun 大寶積經論, the Chinese 
translation of the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā, a commentary which is attributed to Sthiramati 
(see Kramer 2019, 456).24 The text was translated into Chinese by the Indian scholar-
monk Bodhiruci 菩提流支 sometime between 508 and 535.25 Assuming that Sthiramati 
was born between 480 and 490 could account for the Chinese translation date. I think 
choosing 480 is a safer bet. If Bodhiruci translated the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā close to the 
508 terminus ante quem, this would entail that Sthiramati wrote his commentary in his 
late twenties. This seems more plausible than surmising he was barely or younger than 
20, as presupposed by setting the birth year to c. 490.26  
                                               
23 Neither is there any evidence to suggest direct exchanges or links between Dignāga and Sthiramati.  
24 The Chinese translation does not record the name of the author. We know it from the colophon of 
the Tibetan translation which attributes the text to Blo-brtan = Sthiramati (see Kramer 2019, 456; 
Matsuda and Asano 1997, 152-153).  
25 Unfortunately, the historical records and scriptural catalogues 經録 do not provide any clues for 
a more precise dating. One of the most reliable testimonies comes from Li Kuo 李廓, a younger 
contemporary of Bodhiruci, who lists some of the most important translations done by the Indian 
master, the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā included. The only chronological detail he mentions is that 
Bodhiruci’s activity stretches for more than twenty years 二十餘年. Since the note is taken during 
the Tianping 天平 era (534-537), it means that Bodhiruci must have started his translation activity 
around 510. Li Kuo’s note is recorded in the Xu gao seng zhuan 續高僧傳 (T.50.428c17-229a5) (see 
also Kamata 1990, 146-147). This is practically the only reliable document from Bodhiruci’s age.  
More data is found in the Lidai sanbao ji 歴代三寶紀, but this is a notoriously unreliable 
scriptural catalogue. According to it, the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā was the result of a co-operation 
between Ratnamati 勒那摩提 and Bodhiruci, the latter being given a secondary role. Both Indian 
masters deemed, however, that it was beneath their dignity to consult with each other, so in the end 
each went his way and produced an independent version. These two separate versions were later 
collated and edited by unnamed redactors into one single text (see T 49.86b). The Lidai sanbao ji also 
records that Ratnamati translated the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā in the 5th year of the Zhengshi 正始 era, 
i.e. 508 (T 49.44c). This would seem, however, rather too early for Bodhiruci, who had just arrived in 
the Middle Kingdom. Kamata 1990, 156-158, critically examines the Lidai sanbao ji claims 
concluding that the two Indian scholar-monks may have worked together on the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā 
but Bodhiruci must be regarded as the main translator. The Japanese scholar does not, however, 
advance any hypothesis on its date. In all likelihood, this is as far as we can get in this specific case.  
26 I would hesitate to go as early as 470-550, i.e. the dates hypothesised for Sthiramati by Cuong Tu 
Nguyen (see Kramer 2019, 456).  
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As for his death, this must have happened around 550. The date is required not only 
by the 70-year lifespan argued above but also by two traditional testimonies. We owe the 
first one to the same Ji 基 who records that Sthiramati was ‘the senior contemporary of 
the Śāstra Master Dharmapāla’ (護法論師同時先德。T43.231c21).27  
The second one comes from Xuanzang’s biography. Apart from the intensive 
training received at Nālandā Monastery, the famous Chinese translator furthered his 
knowledge of the Yogācārabhūmi with a layman-scholar named *Jayasena or *Prasenajit 
勝軍. According to Xuanzang’s account, in his youth Jayasena ‘had studied grammar 
(*śabdavidyā) as well as Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna treatises under Bodhisattva Sthiramati. 
He had also studied the Yogācārabhūmi with Dharmācārya Śīlabhadra’ (又從安慧菩薩
學聲明大小乘論。又從戒賢法師學瑜伽論。T50.244a8-10). Jayasena was very old 
when Xuanzang met him, probably as old as or slightly younger than Śīlabhadra, 
Xuanzang’s main ācārya and Nālandā abbot, who was aged 106 in 630.28 If we place 
Sthiramati’s death much earlier than around 550, this chronology wouldn’t fit.  
So if Jayasena was born sometime between 525 and 530, we can arrive at a 
plausible scenario of Sthiramati’s teaching Jayasena not long before his death around the 
middle of the 6th century. Tentatively, I would thus suggest adjusting the dates of 
Sthiramati to c. 480-550.29  
                                               
27  The binome 先德 raises a few problems. Literally, it means ‘earlier [/previous] virtuous 
[/accomplished] [person]’, and its semantic sphere encompasses such meanings as ‘virtuous or 
accomplished person(s) of earlier generation(s)’ and ‘one’s senior in age and/or virtue’. As such it is 
often used as a term of respect for patriarchs or eminent monks (see Nakamura 1981, 837a, s.v.; Oda 
2009 [1954], 1046c, s.v.). It is the collocation with 同時 ‘same age’ that makes me choose the 
meaning of ‘one’s senior’ in this specific context.  
More importantly, the passage allows for different punctuations leading to different meanings. The 
Taishō editors punctuate: 護法論師同時先德。南印度境羅羅國人也。The two sentences can, 
however, be punctuated as 護法論師同時。先德南印度境羅羅國人也。  This translates as 
‘[Sthiramati] was the contemporary of the Śāstra Master Dharmapāla. The Venerable Master 先德 
[i.e. Sthiramati] was a man of the Country of *Lāḷa/Lāṭa [*Valabhī?], on the border with/of Southern 
India.’ Classical Chinese is notoriously difficult in deciding where one sentence ends and the next 
begins. One often needs to trust his/her instinct. As an old Japanese pun goes, ‘Classical Chinese (漢
文 kanbun) is a written language of intuition (勘文 kanbun)’. I can’t boast of much of an intuition 
(otherwise I’d be playing the stock market rather than dating Buddhism), so I’ll just follow the instincts 
of the Taishō editors.  
28 See also note 30 below.  
29 This discussion here does not incorporate the scenario of two Sthiramati-s, advocated by a number 
of scholars, most recently and convincingly by Sakuma (2013). The re-examination of external 
evidence (historical documents and epigraphical records) as well as internal evidence (differences in 
22
Early Pramāṇavāda Chronology Revisited 
Bhāviveka 
Bhāviveka is usually dated 500-570 (Kajiyama 1982, 9; Seyfort Ruegg 2010 [1982], 23; 
Eckel and Eltschinger 2019, 81 [following Kajiyama], etc.) or 490-570 (Ejima 2003, 48; 
He 2014, 166). Given the 70-year median value, I favour the former hypothesis, without 
tweaking the dates. True, Bhāviveka’s argumentation presupposes familiarity with the 
Dignāga’s logic (see Ejima 2003, 48-49, 424-426; He 2014, 169-170), but placing the 
latter two generations earlier than the Frauwallnerian theory (which presupposes a two-
decade interval between the two philosophers) doesn’t, I believe, make a real difference. 
Dharmapāla 
Most modern scholars date Dharmapāla to 530-561 (see Moriyama 2019, 168). One of 
the few exceptions is Funayama (2000) who argues for placing Dharmapāla between 530 
and 590.30 No matter whether we agree or not with the short-life scenario found in most 
traditional and modern sources, by all accounts Dignāga predated Dharmapāla. Tāranātha 
actually makes the latter Dignāga’s disciple. The Tibetan chronicler tells us that 
Dharmapāla ‘repeatedly listened to ācārya Dignāga [expounding] the Piṭaka, 
accompanied by all ancillary branches [of knowledge]’ (slob dpon Phyogs kyi glang po 
las sde snod yan lag dang bcas pa thams cad slar yang nan te | Chos-T p. 124, ll. 2-3). 
the content of the works attributed Sthiramati) leads the Japanese scholar to postulate two authors 
named Sthiramati, one active before the Valabhī inscription number 7 (dated 588), the other active 
around the Valabhī inscription number 21 (dated 662). As pointed out by Sakuma, we are still in the 
process of re-assessing the Sthiramati corpus, and more data about the content of each work is 
necessary. In this sense, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, but I tend to agree with Sakuma 
and his two-Sthiramati scenario. The discussion above therefore refers to Sthiramati the younger.  
   One more aspect: placing Sthiramati’s birth 20 years earlier has the additional advantage of 
accounting chronologically for a philosophical debate which also involved Dignāga. If Sthiramati was 
born around 480, his teacher, Guṇamati, should likewise be dated earlier, i.e. c. 450-520. We know 
that Guṇamati won a debate against a Sāṅkhya master named Mādhava (see Eltschinger 2019b, 179) 
whose views are also attacked by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (see Hattori 1968, 57-59).  
30 The episode adduced by Funayama is not conclusive. Xuanzang records in the Da Tang Xiyu ji (T 
51.914c-915a) the story of Śīlabhadra’s being entrusted by his master Dharmapāla with an important 
debate when the former was only 30 years old. Śīlabhadra was the learned Nālandā abbot under whom 
Xuanzang studied. We know that when Xuanzang met him in 630, the venerable Master was already 
106 years old, which puts his year of birth earlier than Dharmapāla. As Xuanzang does not specify 
Dharmapāla’s age at the time of this episode, nothing prevents us from assuming that he was in his 
(late?) twenties and died aged 32 as the traditional sources record (e.g. Ji’s account at T 43.231c13). 




This would imply that Dharmapāla was born earlier than 530. According to my hypothesis, 
we would have to place Dharmapāla’s birth at least as early as c. 480. Even according to 
the Frauwallner’s dating, we would need to lower the year of his birth by at least one 
decade. Given that no historical evidence supports the possibility of such an earlier date, 
the adjustment would be forced. Furthermore, no other source, traditional or modern, 
corroborates the master-disciple scenario depicted in Tāranātha’s account.  
This does not mean, however, that there is no connection between the two scholar-
monks. Dharmapāla appears to have been familiar with Dignāga’s work, a fact suggested 
by a passage in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra 成唯識論  which interprets and 
elaborates on Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.10 (see Hattori 1968, 5; Moriyama 2019, 170-171). 
But to explain this, we do not need to postulate a master-disciple relation. If my dating 
approximates the historical reality, Dignāga’s works must have already attained 
recognition amongst Buddhist scholars in the early decades of the 6th century. It comes 
thus as no surprise that an eminent exegete like Dharmapāla was familiar with Dignāga’s 
logic. It is therefore not necessary to modify the widely accepted dating of 530-561.  
Dharmakīrti 
The last major figure to discuss is Dharmakīrti, whose dating is actually the thorniest. 
Both Bu-ston (Chos-B, Chandra ed. #851 = Ya 110a; cf. Obermiller tr. 1996, 152-153) 
and Tāranātha (Chos-T p. 135, ll. 13-20; cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 229) 
tell us that Dharmakīrti studied the Pramāṇasamuccaya under Īśvarasena who allegedly 
was Dignāga’s direct pupil. Tāranātha (Chos-T p. 135, l. 12; cf. Chimpa and 
Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 229) further mentions that Dharmakīrti had been ordained by 
Dharmapāla (slob dpon Chos-skyong las rab tu byung nas |).  
Modern scholars, on the other hand, have rarely adopted this straightforward 
lineage and the chronology it suggests.31 Once again, Frauwallner’s hypothesis (1982 
[1961], 859-861), which places Dharmakīrti between roughly 600 and 660, reigns 
supreme.32 The main argument put forward by Frauwallner is Xuanzang’s silence. The 
31 One of the few modern scholars who favours the chronology and lineage recorded in the Tibetan 
tradition is Stcherbatsky (1993 [1930-1932], 31-32, 34).  
32 Frauwallner is not the first scholar to propose this dating. As early as 1857 in the Buddizm, ego 
dogmatȳ, istoriya i literatura (translated into German as Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte 
und Literatur in 1860), the Russian Sinologist and Buddhologist Vasily Pavlovich Vasilyev (better 
known in the West as Wassili Wassiljew) dated Dharmakīrti to the 7th century while the Bengali 
scholar Satis Chandra Vidyabusana (alternatively spelled as Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan) suggested 
c. 635-650 in his posthumous A History of Indian Logic, published in 1921. For this and more details,
see Franco 2018a, 117-118. 
In modern Japanese studies, the dating of Dharmakīrti often follows Frauwallner’s hypothesis. 
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great Chinese translator, who journeyed to Central Asia and India between 629 and 645,33 
does not say a word about Dharmakīrti. On the other hand, the scholar-monk Yijing, who 
wrote a travelogue of South and Southeast Asia sometime before 691, lists the Indian 
logician among the recent 近 generation of outstanding Dharma masters.34 Yijing also 
notes that ‘Dharmakīrti further clarified the [principles of] logic (*hetuvidyā)’ 法稱則重
顯因明 (T 54.229b20).35  
 
                                               
Alternatively, scholars like Nakamura (1989 [1980], 301) and Hirakawa (1979, 229) suggest an even 
later date by placing Dharmakīrti’s activity around 650.  
33 Many historical sources place the beginning of Xuanzang’s journey in the 8th month of the 3rd year 
of the Zhenguan 貞元 era, i.e. 629. The Guang hong ming ji 廣弘明記, on the other hand, records 
that Xuanzang set off on the journey in the 1st year of the Zhenguan era, i.e. 626, a date adopted by 
some modern scholars (see Kamata 1999, 262). Chen 2018, 7, similarly mentions that the historical 
sources disagree on the date when Xuanzang began his journey. Chen adopts 627 according to the 
chronology established by the Chinese historian Yang Tingfu (1988). I haven’t looked into all the 
details of the matter, but I follow Kamata (1999, 262) who favours the year 629, a date actually adopted 
in many other scholarly publications.  
Xuanzang made his triumphal return to the Tang capital Chang’an 長安 on the 24th day of the 1st 
month of the 19th year of the Zhenyuan era, 645 (ibid. 282), a date which, as far as I know, is not 
disputed in any historical source (most probably because it was a major public event).  
34 T 54.229b16-17. See note 12 above. Yijing’s journey took place from 671 to 695, but he wrote the 
travelogue while still in Southeast Asia and gave the manuscript to a Chinese monk returning to the 
Middle Kingdom (see Li 2000, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, p. 2). Kamata 1999, 387, mentions a 
hypothesis which places Yijing’s return to China in 698, but he adopts the more common date of 695. 
35 Li (2000, 152) translates: ‘Dharmakīrti reglorified the study of hetuvidyā’. It is no doubt a possible 
interpretation but I incline to take 顯  here in the sense of ‘clarify’. Li construes it as ‘make 
[something] conspicuous’, with the derived meaning of ‘extol, to glorify’.  
As far as one can judge from the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims, the hetuvidyā was a well-
established discipline in the large monastic centres in the 7th century. Xuanzang tells us that logic was 
one of the regular subjects at Nālandā (T 50.239b26). Yijing mentions several contemporary 
dharmācāryas active in various parts of India who were ‘intent on emulating Dignāga in mastering 
logic (*hetuvidyā)’ (曉因明論, 則思擬陳那。T 54.229c16-17). From the viewpoint of institutional 
success at least, logic appears to have been ‘glorified’ enough even before Dharmakīrti’s impact. 
In line with my reading of 顯, I construe 重 as expressing here an intensifying degree of the 
verbal action, i.e. ‘further’. Alternatively, 重  may have a temporal meaning, in which case the 
sentence would read: ‘Dharmakīrti once again clarified the [principles of] logic (*hetuvidyā)’. This 





We shall shortly return to Xuanzang’s silence but let’s first take a look at some recent 
hypotheses on Dharmakīrti’s dates. The past decades have witnessed a few attempts 
challenging Frauwallner’s theory and arguing for new possibilities of dating. The most 
important ones include Lindtner 1980, Kimura 1999, Krasser 2012, and Balcerowicz 
2016. The first two contributions are generally believed to rest on inconclusive evidence 
(see Eltschinger 2019b, 157), but Krasser 2012 was initially met with approval, albeit 
cautious, even from some of the leading scholars in the field.36 Krasser’s arguments do 
appear solid especially as he relies not only on historical materials but also on inner 
evidence supposedly derived from primary sources. The conclusion reached by Krasser 
is that both Bhāviveka and Sthiramati were familiar with several key doctrines formulated 
by Dharmakīrti and Kumārila (see especially pp. 578-580). This led Krasser to 
hypothesise that Dharmakīrti’s activity should be placed by the middle of the 6th century.37  
It didn’t take long, however, for other experts to show that the interpretation of the 
inner evidence adduced by Krasser was not as sound as it first appeared. In a meticulously 
argued contribution, Franco (2018a) examines each piece of evidence presented by 
Krasser and shows that it is either flawed or open to different interpretations. Franco’s 
verdict is merciless: ‘when considered closely, Krasser’s entire evidence for the alleged 
relationship between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti disappears into thin air’ (2018a, 123).  
According to Franco (2018a, 127-129), the dating of Dharmakīrti’s activity to mid-
                                               
36 Eltschinger, for instance, seems to favour in his 2010 study the dates suggested by Krasser (whose 
study is referred to as ‘forthcoming’). Later, however, Eltschinger (2019b) changes his view adopting 
a more cautious dating (see below). Likewise, Steinkellner (2013, vol. I, XXIX-XXX), the doyen of 
Buddhist logic and epistemology, initially shows openness to ‘Krasser’s new dating’, adding, however, 
that ‘prudence is still called for when applying internal relationships for establishing relative 
chronologies in this period’ (id. XXIX). As we shall see below, Prof. Steinkellner has meanwhile 
modified his position.  
I confess that initially I was quite enthusiastic about Krasser’s arguments. It was thanks to Prof. 
Steinkellner, who kindly shared his recent views on the subject and provided me with Franco’s study 
(2018a), that I reformulated my hypothesis on Dharmakīrti’s dates. I take the opportunity to 
acknowledge and express my heartfelt gratitude for Prof. Steinkellner’s feedback.  
37 Balcerowicz investigates the problem from a fresh angle: Dharmakīrti’s critical exchanges with two 
Jain writers, Samantabhadra (530-590) and Pūjyapāda Devanandin (540-600). (These are the dates 
given by Balcerowicz.) Samantabhadra in particular seems to have influenced Dharmakīrti directly, 
and can allegedly be taken as the terminus ante quem for dating the Buddhist logician. Balcerowicz 
(2016, 477) concludes that the dates of Dharmakīrti should be set between 550 and 610. Balcerowicz’s 
insights offer valuable hints, but the basic argument as far Dharmakīrti’s dating is concerned heavily 
relies on Krasser’s hypothesis.  
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6th century makes hard to understand why neither Buddhist philosophers (most 
importantly Candrakīrti) nor Jain authors active in the 7th century make no mention of 
Dharmakīrti or show no awareness of his doctrines. ‘Consequently’ – Franco tells us – 
‘we may conclude that Xuanzang’s silence is also due to the fact that Dharmakīrti was 
not generally known before the second half of the seventh century’ (2018a, 129). Franco 
(2018a, 132) does not commit himself to a concrete dating wrapping up his meticulous 
examination with the following words:   
 
As we have seen, Krasser’s essay creates more problems than it solves. But it is also 
a useful reminder that our current dating of Dharmakīrti as well as of practically all 
Indian philosophers from the sixth and seventh centuries does not rest on solid 
foundations and is to some extent suppositious.  
 
In one of the most recent contributions on the great Indian logician, Eltschinger 
(2019b, 157) also mention Krasser’s arguments adding that they have received ‘detailed 
[…] criticism’.38 Eltschinger (ibid.) prudently opts for a rough dating:  
 
Given the weakness of all arguments proposed so far (including Frauwallner’s), the 
wisest course is perhaps to provisionally date Dharmakīrti’s period of activity to 
around 600, or some time between 550 and 660.39 
 
Should we then return to Frauwallner’s hypothesis? My guess (and it’s only a 
guess) is that placing Dharmakīrti’s birth around 600 may be too late. If Dignāga lived 
between c. 430 and 500, as argued in this paper, that would put more than three 
                                               
38 Eltschinger mentions here contributions by Kataoka, Franco, and Watanabe, all referred to as 
‘mostly as yet unpublished’. (The qualification most likely suggests that Eltschinger had drafted his 
contribution before the publication of Franco’s article in 2018.)  
39 Tillemans 1999, 53, chooses an even wider span of time for dating Dharmakīrti: ‘6th-7th C.E.’.  
Prof. Steinkellner’s latest thoughts on the matter, which he generously shared with me in a personal 
communication, also show a great deal of caution opting for an approximate dating. With his kind 
permission, I reproduce here the main points: ‘As far as Dharmakīrti’s dating is concerned, I now 
desist from saying anything more concrete than “around 600”. I don't think Dharmakīrti can be much 
earlier. The only firm terminus ante quem is Śāntarakṣita before whom we have to pile in the early 
commentators, i.e. Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, and Jinendrabuddhi as well as Arcaṭa.’  
I must stress here that although Prof. Steinkellner’s views, together with Franco’s and 
Eltschinger’s latest contributions, have greatly influenced my rethinking of Dharmakīrti’s dates, I’m 
entirely responsible for the hypothesis I surmise in this paper.  
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generations between the two great Patriarchs of the Pramāṇavāda tradition.40 In such a 
case, one would expect to see the names of more prominent logicians within the space of 
one century which had elapsed between Dignāga’s death and Dharmakīrti’s birth.41 
Given, however, the hazy nature of Indian records, the argument is admittedly weak.  
Apart from this subjectively tinted guess, my conjecture is encouraged by some of 
the most authoritative voices in the field of Buddhist logic which seem open to the idea 
of dating Dharmakīrti around 600 rather than 600-660. True, real scholars wisely avoid 
committing themselves any further. But being neither a real scholar nor wise, I’ll take the 
bull by its horns and state it in concrete terms: how about 570-640? (Now I have to face 
both Procrustes and the bull!)  
By tentatively dating Dharmakīrti to c. 570-640 we would have about two 
generations plus separating him from Dignāga, which seems more plausible and is also 
tacitly presupposed by Frauwallner’s hypothesis. One name in the generation preceding 
Dharmakīrti is well-known, i.e. that of his own master Īśvarasena. But wasn’t Īśvarasena 
Dignāga’s pupil? At least, this is what Bu-ston and Tāranātha are telling us. This, however, 
is not supported by any other historical source, and no inner evidence suggests the 
                                               
40  I say ‘more than three generations’ because in a scenario setting the logician’s birth c. 600, 
Dharmakīrti would have mastered Dignāga’s system of logic around, I surmise, 615-620. We don’t 
know exactly at what age Indian monks began their study of advanced logic, but even if they started 
by simply memorising the texts at an early age, I find it hard to believe that they would have fully 
comprehended and engaged in (what we would nowadays call) critical assessment of the doctrines 
before the age of 14-15. Dharmakīrti may have been a hetuvidyā prodigy but within humanly possible 
limits. By his own account, his ‘commitment increased by the study of the well-spoken words over 
and over again for a long time’ (ciraṃ sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanaṃ). This is a statement made by 
the logician himself in the maṅgalaśloka of the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, which probably is his first 
work (see Frauwallner 1982 [1954]; Steinkellner forthcoming). It is hard to quantify ‘for a long time’ 
but the śloka doesn’t strike me as being written by a young teenager reminiscing about his childhood 
efforts. (For the full translation of the maṅgalaśloka, see below.)  
Furthermore, Tāranātha tells us Dharmakīrti studied the Vedas, ancillary subjects, and classical 
systems of philosophy but ‘became extremely proficient in all tīrthika tenets only around the age of 
sixteen or eighteen’ (lo bcu drug gam bco brgyad tsam mu stegs kyi grub mtha’ thams cad la shin tu 
mkhas par gyur | Chos-T 135.4-5). It was actually after being recognised by the brahmin pundits for 
this proficiency that Dharmakīrti began studying Buddhist scriptures and realised the faults of the 
tīrthika systems (Chos-T 135; cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 229). In spite of its late date 
and hence diminished historical value, Tāranātha’s account paints a fairly believable picture at least 
in terms of the ‘debut’ age of a young scholar in traditional India.  
41 Needless to say, quantifying the distance between thinkers in terms of generations is a highly 
arbitrary and subjective process.  
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straightforward lineage.  
Here, I believe, we can invoke Frauwallner’s methodological principle according 
to which tradition is likely to lose track of minor figures and patch up lineages with names 
of famous masters (1982 [1961], 848-849). This is not a mere convenient magical wand. 
In this case it is a pretty safe guess. By placing Dharmakīrti one more generation earlier, 
i.e. something like c. 540-610, we would risk having part of his activity coincide with 
Bhāviveka. This would be too close to Krasser’s dating, which, as pointed out above, is 
marred with serious flaws.42  
All in all, it seems preferable to surmise a two-generation gap between the two 
great logicians and thus date Dharmakīrti to roughly 570-640.43  
 
*** 
What are we to make of Xuanzang’s silence? This is one of the most uncertain certainties 
concerning Dharmakīrti. We know for a fact that neither Xuanzang nor his direct disciples 
say a word about the Pramāṇavāda Patriarch. But how to read this remains uncertain. It 
is a semantic black hole: it sucks any possible interpretation and lets nothing sure come 
out of it. Xuanzang’s silence can be made to accommodate pretty much any hypothesis, 
and my own reading won’t escape this gravitational pull. Truth be told, I’ll avail myself 
of the emptiness (śūnyatā!) of conclusive proof and surmise a scenario accounting for the 
570-640 dating. The only consolation is that so does everyone no matter how we juggle 
the data.  
Xuanzang travelled and studied in Central Asia and India between 629 and 645. 
Timewise, no matter what chronology we adopt, the famous Chinese pilgrim could have 
come in contact with Dharmakīrti’s works and ideas. Why doesn’t he say a word? Two 
lines of interpretation are possible. Either Xuanzang knew about Dharmakīrti but chose 
to remain silent. Or he had no knowledge of Dharmakīrti’s works because they had not 
attained the fame they would enjoy later in the century. The latter is the interpretation put 
forward by Frauwallner 1982 [1961] and, in a newly argued manner, by Franco 2018a. 
Roughly speaking, I agree with this scenario but my conjecture of the whys and hows is 
                                               
42 It is possible to speculate that although Dharmakīrti’s youth coincided with Bhāviveka’s last 30 
years of life, the latter was not aware of the logician’s theories. Nonetheless, the only merit of such a 
hypothesis would be to give credit to Bu-ston’s and Tāranātha’s account of the Dignāga-Īśvarasena 
direct lineage. Even if we leave aside the Frauwallnerian principle discussed above, this scenario 
would still suffer from a major weakness. Following in the footsteps of Franco (2018a, 127-129), one 
could argue that placing Dharmakīrti too early in the 6th century would leave unexplained why 7th 
century Buddhist and Jain philosophers do not show awareness of his theories. The gap between 
Dharmakīrti’s life and his recognition would be too wide.  
43 An in-between dating is hypothesised by Barcelowicz (2016) who suggests c. 550-610.  
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rather different, which makes it possible to date the logician to c. 570-640.  
I’ll say more in a few moments but let’s first briefly examine the deliberate 
omission scenario. This has been advocated by Krasser 2012 as well as, in softer tones, 
by Balcerowicz 2016. According to Krasser (2012, 585-7), Dharmakīrti became a persona 
non grata in the eyes of the Nālandā leaders for some of his overly audacious theories, 
first and foremost the alleged claim that ‘āgama, including the words of the Buddha, is 
not a pramāṇa on a sāṃvyavahārika level’ (ibid. 585-6). This was hell of a damning 
challenge to the entire Buddhist establishment. And it was also the reason behind 
Xuanzang’s silence, the Chinese master staying in line with the Nālandā orthodoxy. Once 
again, Franco’s outstanding study (2018a) convincingly shows that none of Krasser’s 
arguments are tenable. They represent forced conclusions or speculations made without 
sufficient, if any, textual proof.  
One thing we know straight from the horse’s mouth is that Dharmakīrti complains 
about being misunderstood and his work doomed to oblivion. He does it twice in the 
Pramāṇavārttika, at the beginning of his autocommentary on Chapter One and at the end 
of the opus. In the second auspicious verse (maṅgalaśloka) opening the Pramāṇavārttika 
(p. 2),44 the logician laments the Dharma Philistinism and declares his work a failed effort 
to make the ‘well-spoken words’, i.e. logic, known to the world:  
 
    Most45 people wont to vulgar [pursuits] and intellectually unfit not only find 
the well-spoken words [of logic] insignificant but being afflicted with foul 
envy [may] even show hostility [towards it].  
    Hence, this [treatise of mine] is, methinks, of no use to others. My mind, 
however, its commitment increased by the study of the well-spoken words 
over and over again for a long time, has grown [so] fond of them [that I 
shall expound their principles in what follows].  
      (prāyaḥ prakṛtasaktir apratibalaprajño janaḥ kevalam  
       nānarthy eva subhāṣitaiḥ parigato vidveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ |  
       tenāyaṃ na paropakāra iti naś cintāpi cetaś ciram  
       sūktabhyāsavivardhitavyasanam ity atrānubaddhaspṛham ||)  
 
Dharmakīrti’s pessimism is again voiced at the end of the magnum opus. In verse 286 of 
                                               
44 Miyasaka ed., p. 2, names them ‘salutation verses’ (namaskārakaśloka). According to Miyasaka 
(id. note 1) the opening verses were added later by another author. The Japanese scholar mentions, 
however, that Karṇakagomin writes in his commentary that these are Dharmakīrti’s own verses. Other 
scholars, Frauwallner included, also regard them as being part of Dharmakīrti’s original work.  
45 Skt. prāya can also mean ‘as a rule, usually’, etc. (see Monier-Williams 708, s.v.). Cf. Tib. phal 
cher, likewise meaning ‘majority of’ as well as ‘usually’.  
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Chapter IV (id. p. 204),46 the logician bewails the tragic fate of his teachings in words 
echoing the feelings of a misunderstood genius of the Romantic age:  
          
         Not comprehended is it even by those with considerable intellectual 47 
capacities who have immersed themselves in it,  
         Not understood is it, [its very essence] being the Supreme Truth, even by those 
who make utmost efforts –    
         This doctrine48 of mine which has found no one in this world able to grasp 
it.49  
         Once old age [will creep] upon my body, it will exhaust itself as the waters 
[flowing] into the [vast] sea.50  
                                               
46 The verse is also quoted in the aesthetics masterpiece Dhvanyāloka Ch. 3, §41 (text division 
following Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan 1990, which base their translation on the Kashi Sanskrit 
Series, Volume 135, edition unfortunately unavailable to me; I checked the original in Rai ed., pp. 
537-538, as well as the citation in Balcerowicz 2016, 476, for which see note 51 below).  
It must be added, however, that the stanza is not found in the Pramāṇavārttika versions cited in 
the later commentaries (see Balcerowicz 2016, 476).  
47 Skt. analpadhīśaktināpy literally renders as ‘even those of no small wisdom ability’.  
48 Skt. mata literally means ‘[what is] thought/believed [by me]’. The lexeme also has, however, the 
more abstract meaning of ‘view, doctrine’ (see Monier-Williams 783, s.v.). Balcerowicz 2016, 476, 
translates as ‘philosophy’. Rai 2004, 537, likewise renders into Hindi by using the same word mata 
(which has been preserved in Hindi with the similar meanings of ‘creed, idea, doctrine’) and adds in 
brackets dārśanika siddhānta, i.e. ‘philosophical theory/tenets’. I single out the term because it is 
suggestive of how Dharmakīrti viewed the nature of his intellectual efforts, which probably tally with 
our modern perceptions. They are described as mata, i.e. a philosophical system or set of doctrines 
rather than writings based on faith or spiritual praxis guidelines (though presumably it was relevant to 
the latter, too).   
49 Skt. jagaty alabdhasadṛśapratigrāhakam can also be construed as ‘has not found in this world one 
worthy of receiving it’, or, as rendered by Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan (1990, 626), ‘has failed to 
find in this world a philosopher worthy of its challenge’ (see more in note 50 below). Balcerowicz 
(2016, 476), on the other hand, suggests another line of interpretation: ‘[my philosophy] which makes 
one understand even [things] in the world which equal something ungraspable’.  
50  I fear my rendering of the stanza may be rather crude. In the accomplished hands of the 
distinguished Indologists Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan (1990, 626), its translation reads:  
‘My philosophy, into which the brightest minds 
have not trusted to plunge,  
of which the ultimate truth has not been seen 




adṛṣṭaparamārthattvam51 adhikābhiyogair api |  
mataṃ mama jagaty alabdhasadṛśapratigrāhakam 
prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva svadehe jarām ||)52 
 
We get it: the logician was as bitter as bitter can be. But that was at the time of 
writing the Pramāṇavārttika, which in all likelihood is an early work.53 It does not, 
therefore, entail that he remained the same misunderstood genius throughout life. After 
all, no other work of his contains similar verses. And an opus like the Nyāyabindu seems 
to have been ‘composed for a circle of students who gathered around Dharmakīrti’ 
(Franco 2018a, 129). Furthermore, as also pointed out by Franco (id.), there is no 
compelling evidence to suggest that the ‘people wont to vulgar pursuits and intellectually 
unfit’ (prakṛtasaktir apratibalaprajño janaḥ) were the inimical Nālandā officials 
postulated by Krasser (2012).  
So if not a threat to the establishment and not exactly a lifelong solitary genius, 
how do we explain Xuanzang’s silence? The scenario I surmise presupposes a slow 
gradual recognition of Dharmakīrti’s genius due to (1) geographical, (2) human, and (3) 
technical reasons. Let’s take them one by one.  
                                               
a philosopher worthy of its challenge:  
it will grow old within myself like the unplumbed  
waters of the sea within the sea.’  
51  The citation in Balcerowicz 2016, 476, reads: °paramārthasāram. Balcerowicz follows the 
Durgāprasāda & Paṇśīkar edition and Krishnamoorthy edition (unfortunately neither available to me). 
52 It is interesting the note the context in which Ānandavardhana (9th century) cites the stanza in his 
Dhvanyāloka. The Kashmiri aesthetician first quotes another poem attributed to Dharmakīrti, in which 
the great logician sings of a belle sorely distressed by the fact that she can find no lover to match her 
qualities. Ānandavardhana tells us that Dharmakīrti couldn’t have meant a real belle because, inter 
alia, such feelings could not have come from the mouth/pen of an ascetic. (But isn’t beauty all the 
more enticing when refusing oneself sensual gratification?). Therefore, the aesthetician concludes, the 
poem must be an allegory (aprastutapraśaṃsā) for ‘a lament by a man puffed up with pride in his 
uncommon talents, on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities because he has fired their 
jealousy by the degree of his brilliance’ (Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan 1990, 625). As an 
illustration that this is indeed the way Dharmakīrti must have felt, and hence meant by the poem under 
discussion, Ānandavardhana cites the above verse from the Pramāṇavārttika (without, however, 
mentioning the title of the source).  
53 For a classical study on the chronology of Dharmakīrti’s works, see Frauwallner 1982 [1954]. In 
his excellent forthcoming study, Prof. Steinkellner revisits the chronology offering an updated version. 
Both towering figures of the Buddhist logic concur that the Pramāṇavārttika is an early opus.  
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*** 
(1) According to Bu-ston (Chos-B, Chandra ed. #851 = Ya 110a; cf. Obermiller tr. 1996, 
152) and Tāranātha (Chos-T p. 134, l. 18; cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 228), 
Dharmakīrti was born in the Kingdom of *Cūḍāmaṇi (Tib. rGyal dbang gTsug gi nor bu) 
in South India.54 The same accounts also record events which link his life mostly to the 
southern part of the subcontinent.55 More importantly, neither Bu-ston nor Tāranātha 
associate his main activities with Nālandā.  
The only mention of the famed monastic university is found in Tāranātha’s account 
(Chos-T p. 138, ll. 7ff; cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 232-233). According to 
it, Śaṅkarācārya dispatched a messenger to Nālandā challenging the Buddhist community 
to a public debate. The Nālandā monastics postponed the event for one year in order to 
send for Dharmakīrti to come from the South. Needless to say, when the clash of titans 
happens one year later, the great Buddhist logician carries the day.  
In all likelihood, the whole episode is an embellishment to Dharmakīrti’s legendary 
career of defeating one tīrthika heavyweight after another. Śaṅkara’s dates are equally 
controversial, but most modern scholars seem to agree that he lived after Dharmakīrti.56 
What is more important for us is that even by Tāranātha’s time, about one millennium 
later, Dharmakīrti’s main place of activity was not associated with Nālandā. In the 
account above, he had to be called from the South, which took one year. This is another 
relevant detail. It reminds us that the movement of people and ideas did take long even in 
a pan-Indian network like the Buddhist Saṅgha.  
 
*** 
(2) The ‘human factor’ argument is admittedly the weakest chain in my scenario. 
                                               
54 As far as I know, the precise location of the kingdom has not been identified. While giving the same 
name, Tāranātha adds that such a place does not appear (mi snang) to be known. (Chos-T p. 134, l. 
19). I wonder if it has any connection to the Cūḍāmaṇivihāra in Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu.  
55 We must add, nonetheless, that Tāranātha also mentions such places like Magadha and Mathurā, 
albeit as temporary locations where Dharmakīrti carried out his debate tour (Chos-T p. 139; cf. Chimpa 
and Chattopadhyaya tr. 1990, 234).  
56 It is true that Śaṅkara’s dating stretches between early 5th century to early 9th century, but the 8th 
century remains the most likely candidate. I’ll only mention here the dates hypothesised by two top 
specialists in the field. Flood 1996, 239, gives the widely adopted 788-820 dating. Potter 1981, 14, on 
the other hands, argues for placing Śaṅkara a century earlier, which would still make the Vedānta 
Patriarch one or two generations younger than Dharmakīrti even if the latter’s dates were 600-660. It 
is true that Śaṅkara refers to Dharmakīrti’s works, but this is generally taken as an indication that the 
Vedānta master must be placed after the Buddhist logician (see Flood 1996, 239).  
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Obviously, there is so little we know about Dharmakīrti the man and his milieu that 
anything I’m going to say is doomed to be hyper-speculative. But two hardly discernible 
dots in this fog of uncertainty give me some hope that my speculations might be sharable 
with a readership tamed by the bodhisattvic ideals of generosity and endurance.  
The first ‘discernible dot’ is the following: Dharmakīrti most probably had pupils 
but they were few and not well organised. This conjecture is inspired from a seminal paper 
by Eli Franco (2018b) dedicated to ‘Yamāri and the Order of Chapters in the 
Pramāṇavārttika’. The 11th century Buddhist logician Yamāri57 argues that the reason for 
which Dharmakīrti wrote an autocommentary only on the first chapter of the 
Pramāṇavārttika was his old age. Furthermore, the argument continues, advanced age 
also accounts for the fact that Dharmakīrti had lost the energy necessary for ensuring the 
proper handing down of his writings (see Franco 2108b, 258). This in turn explains why 
the order of the Pramāṇavārttika chapters had varied so much in the four centuries 
separating Dharmakīrti and Yamāri.  
Yamāri is most probably trying to put up a plausible scenario explaining the many 
whys surrounding the Pramāṇavāda Patriarch. (What a relief to know I’m in prestigious 
company!). The presupposition underlying Yamāri’s argument is that the 
Pramāṇavārttika autocommentary was composed when Dharmakīrti was an old man. 
This, however, as pointed out by Frauwallner and Steinkellner, is not likely.58 The second 
part of Yamāri’s argument may also be doubted. Was the image of an old Dharmakīrti 
unable to supervise the handing down of his works based on factual information reliably 
transmitted into Yamāri’s times? Or was Yamāri doing pretty much the same thing we’re 
all doing nowadays, i.e. trying to come up with educated guesses? It’s hard to say.  
Even if the latter part of the argument is speculative, the fact remains that the order 
of the Pramāṇavārttika chapters was not fixed for many centuries. For the sake of 
argument, let’s assume with Yamāri that this was the result of Dharmakīrti’s advanced 
age. This, however, raises another question: why didn’t his pupils do anything about this? 
I may be extrapolating from the Sino-Japanese tradition, but one usually expects an 
accomplished scholar-monk to be surrounded by a number of disciples who act more or 
less as a well-organised community meant to hand down the master’s legacy to 
posteriority. Of course, the case-by-case principle reigns supreme here as almost 
everywhere else, but even if we suppose that Dharmakīrti was half as successful as Bu-
ston and Tāranātha tell us, I would still imagine a fairly large number of followers who 
would make sure that their master wouldn’t lose precious time on such trifling details like 
editing and putting chapters in good order.  
I know I’m subjective but my favourite answer to the puzzle is to surmise that 
                                               
57 For the dating of Yamāri, see Steinkellner and Much 1995, 103.  
58 See note 53 above.  
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Dharmakīrti had only a handful of close disciples who were not organised into a unified 
group able to manage efficiently the master’s legacy. Why didn’t they act alone? Probably 
they did, and such isolated attempts would explain the later variation in the tradition. 
Bottom line is that for whatever reasons Dharmakīrti did not or could not supervise the 
transmission of his complete works in a standard edition, so to speak. This again seems 
to suggest a small, disparate community of first-generation pupils which was not 
conducive to a fast and efficient circulation of the Opera Dharmakīrtiana throughout the 
learned members of the Saṅgha.  
The second ‘discernible dot’ suggesting a slow recognition of Dharmakīrti’s genius 
may have been his lack of diplomatic skills. To put it bluntly, Dharmakīrti may have been 
too smart for his own good. He was no doubt a remarkably profound philosopher and 
fiercely successful debater, but his victories may have gained him not only admirers but 
also enemies. You may think I’m letting my imagination run wild, and to a certain extent 
I am. But only to a certain extent. His work bears testimony to the fact that he was 
unforgiving with his enemies. And his perfect argumentation, probably delivered with a 
stinging tongue, was directed not only at heretics but also at Buddhists, including his own 
teacher Īśvarasena.  
The intricate technicalities of Dharmakīrti’s criticism of Īśvarasena’s theories are 
brilliantly analysed in a forthcoming study by Steinkellner. Here suffice it to mention that 
his attacks are relentless. More importantly, Dharmakīrti can’t resist spicing his refutation 
with scathing sarcasm. Speaking of his own master, the great logician ‘casually’ remarks, 
‘even if he [were to] listen to [my refutation] again, the Gods-beloved [Īśvarasena] 
obviously is not clever enough to embrace it’ (śṛnvann api devānāmpriyo nāvadhāraṇa-
paṭuḥ; Pramāṇavārttika Autocommentary p. 104, ll. 26–27). 59  Steinkellner 
(forthcoming) surmises that Dharmakīrti probably refers here to a previous dispute which 
he must have had with Īśvarasena.  
Refutation of ideas lies at the heart of the philosopher’s trade, but it is usually 
directed at opponents outside one’s close circle. True, dedicated philosophers will 
subscribe to the Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas adage,60 but criticism of a ‘master’ 
is more likely to be voiced against a theory or two of an otherwise revered idol of 
Antiquity rather than one’s direct mentor, especially if he/she is still alive. Dharmakīrti 
must have been one of those super-dedicated philosophers committed to the truth no 
                                               
59 The translation closely follows the rendering of Steinkellner, forthcoming.  
60  While the roots of the maxim go to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1096a11–15, its current 
wording is modern, the closest source being Bacon’s Opus Majus, Pars I, cap. V. The fastest upāya to 
check its history is – of course! – a quick peek at Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. ‘Amicus 
Plato, sed magis amica veritas’ (accessed 19 September 2019), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amicus_Plato,_sed_magis_ amica_veritas.  
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matter how unwelcome his professionalism may have been. That was unique enough 
within the paradigm of his time, but what made him singular was to unleash his sharp 
irony against his own ācārya, and do it in writing.  
If he went no-holds-barred against his teacher, then how fierce would he get against 
other opponents? Professional? Yes! Diplomatic? Most likely, no! We can imagine how 
emotionally bruised, if not scarred for life, were Dharmakīrti’s opponents after being 
philosophically hammered and publicly scorned in a bout of hetuvidyā Vale Tudo. No 
matter what the noble Dharma tells us about letting go, the defeated opponents must have 
hated his guts, and some may have put this hatred to work.  
As some of these opponents were Buddhist fellow-believers (Īśvarasena was more 
than a fellow!), Dharmakīrti’s image within Saṅgha circles familiar with him was 
probably quite mixed. While he may have had his admirers, there must have been a sizable 
number of those who loathed him. The monastics whom Dharmakīrti faced in the debates 
were most probably members of the scholarly elite, abbots or leading figures of their 
communities surrounded by their own disciples. These were also the people who must 
have played a key role in the spread of information within the Saṅgha.  
It is very hard, if not impossible, to know how new works and ideas circulated in 
the traditional Buddhist communities. And why did some of them attain fast recognition 
while others were slow or, worst, vanished from the picture altogether? Of course, there 
was a continuous flow of people moving around the vihāras, but was a simple 
recommendation from any monastic Tom, Dick, and Harry (or to approximate the context, 
any Rahul, Abhishek, and Aditya)61 enough to propel a certain work to the distinguished 
eyes of the Nālandā elites?  
My guess is a qualified ‘no’. If something got ‘viral’ among the rank and file of the 
Saṅgha, it would have probably caught the attention of the establishment pundits, too. 
But Dharmakīrti’s highly technical treatises aren’t exactly the kind of stuff easily 
becoming huge hits on the ‘Buddhajāla.com’. The key factor in making a text known 
outside its local community was, I imagine, the recommendation from the local elites of 
scholar-monks, i.e. the very people whom Dharmakīrti would have antagonised with his 
sharp mind and tongue. The deliberate thwarting of Dharmakīrti’s efforts to reach wider 
recognition obviously did not go for ever, but it probably slowed the circulation of his 
works by decades.62  
                                               
61  These being apparently the most common male first names in India nowadays according to 
http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/penpals/stats.php3?Pays=IND (accessed 20 September 2019).  
62 We can allow imagination its full play and further speculate on the feelings which a figure like 
Dharmakīrti may have elicited. Not only was he hated by those humiliated in public debates, but his 
genius may also have stirred up envy from peers and even senior members of the Saṅgha. 
Dharmakīrti’s verse cited above squarely puts the blame for the lack of recognition on those afflicted 
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*** 
(3) By technical reasons I refer to two aspects: the huge difficulty of Dharmakīrti’s
philosophy and the inherent nature of institutions to resist change. The former doesn’t
need much explaining. Dharmakīrti’s works are difficult! It does take considerable time
and assiduous efforts to comprehend his complex ideas and elaborate argumentation. Yes,
things must have been much easier for the traditional elites trained in logic and reading
in their native, or near-native, language. But even for such elites a treatise like the
Pramāṇavārttika could have hardly been their casual bedtime reading. Fully grasping the
entire Dharmakīrtian logical and epistemological edifice with all its technical subtleties
and novelties could have taken years even for the brightest minds.
The second aspect refers to institutional inertia, a tendency inherent in any human 
institution. By their very nature, institutions, whether ancient monasteries or modern 
companies, need to ensure stability, and therefore deal with change in a cautious manner, 
albeit at different paces.63 Needless to say, traditional institutions are far less open to 
change, especially when paradigms of faith play a role in the process.  
Nālandā was, most probably, no exception to this rule. The pace at which its learned 
elites accepted and incorporated new ideas into its orthodoxy must have been sluggish. 
Actually, even by the end of the 7th century, Dignāga’s works remained the basic materials 
for the study of Buddhist logic. Yijing gives a list of eight of Dignāga’s treatises which 
constituted the ‘standard’ curriculum for monastics specialising in this field (T 54.230a6-
7). So even if some of Dharmakīrti’s texts had made their way into the Nālandā library 
by the time Xuanzang was studying there, it is very unlikely they would have been 
recommended to him as must-read treatises.64  
by ‘foul envy’ (īrṣyāmala). Centuries later, Ānandavardhana will be assessing the situation behind the 
verse in the same way: his brilliance fired the jealousy of other people. It is hard to say how much 
truth is in such statements, but they are quite plausible. If so, envy may have been another factor which 
slowed down the spread of Dharmakīrti’s works.  
63 This basic characteristic of all human institutions is well-known in sociological and economical 
studies. See, for instance, Kingston and Caballero 2009 (especially section 6), from which I borrow 
the term ‘institutional inertia’.   
64 The old argument that Xuanzang’s had a poor knowledge of logic and/or lacked interest in the 
subject has few, if any, proponents in our days. The hypothesis as voiced by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana is already 
refuted by Frauwallner (1982 [1961], 860-861). The Austrian scholar pertinently points out that 
Xuanzang was not only well trained in logic but his translation of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha also proves 
‘quite a good knowledge’ of the subject. We know now better than ever that Xuanzang received first-
class education in logic in Indian monasteries and did a very good job with his renditions of two basic 





To put my arguments together, here is in brief the scenario I conjecture. Born and active 
mostly in Southern India, far from the great monastic centres of learning in the North, 
Dharmakīrti’s chances of fast recognition were hampered from the very beginning.   
Furthermore, his extraordinary genius, which should have brought much quicker 
fame, was ‘crippled’ by his fiercely polemical nature and a penchant for mocking his 
opponents. This did reflect badly on the human relations factor, which in turn must have 
influenced the readiness of the local elites to promote or circulate his works.  
We know for sure that by the time he completed the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti 
was feeling misunderstood, even hated by ‘people wont to vulgar pursuits and 
intellectually unfit’, a phrase which I take to refer to the local pundits in the South rather 
than the Nālandā establishment. Later in life he seems to have gathered a group of 
disciples around him, but it is rather unlikely their number was large. Even less likely is 
whether this group functioned as a well-organised community actively engaged in the 
preservation and promotion of the Master’s works.  
The immense technical complexity of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical system was 
another ‘natural’ obstacle preventing a speedy access to wide recognition. It did take time 
even for the well-educated readers to comprehend the subtleties and novelties of his genial 
contribution. To make things worse, by the time Dharmakīrti’s works ‘trickled’ into 
Nālandā’s library, another delaying factor kicked in: the institutional inertia which acted 
as the last barrier to the logician’s hope that his system would find enough minds ‘in this 
world able to grasp it’.  
But things were going to change, and change for the better. Not as quickly as 
Dharmakīrti had hoped, but his philosophical legacy was not destined to ‘exhaust itself 
                                               
Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśa 因明入正理論 , translated in 647. For an excellent survey of 
Xuanzang’s logical training in Central Asia and India as well as his translations of Buddhist texts 
connected to logic and epistemology, see Chen 2018, 7-11. Furthermore, his pupils, first and foremost 
Ji 基, the second Patriarch of the Faxiang 法相 school, brilliantly furthered this legacy in their own 
writings. For recent studies discussing Xuanzang’s and his disciples’ familiarity with Buddhist logic, 
see, for instance, Yao 2009, Moro 2013, He 2014, Chen 2018, etc.  
If Xuanzang had a chance to become familiar with Dharmakīrti’s works, he would have been well 
prepared as well as quite interested in introducing them to the Chinese audience. As argued above, my 
guess is that he simply didn’t know anything about the logician’s contributions. Even if manuscripts 
containing Dharmakīrti’s works were somewhere in what must have been the immense library of the 
Nālandā Monastery, they were probably (and wrongly!) placed on the back shelves of opera minora. 
(I wonder if and how such huge collections were organised. Were they catalogued? Or did the readers 
simply browse the shelves? Was there a monastic library staff ready to help?)  
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as the waters flowing into the vast sea’. About one generation after his death, Dharmakīrti 
was becoming more than a local name. ‘Śākyabuddhi, a late 7th century (?) commentator 
of Dharmakīrti, already points to several alternative explanations of a particular difficult 
passage (PVSV 21,6-9), thus testifying to Dharmakīrti’s increasing audience’ 
(Eltschinger 2010). 65  And later in the same century, Yijing will be mentioning the 
logician’s name amongst the crème de la crème of the Buddhist ācāryas throughout the 
centuries.  
This is the story I imagine. I say ‘story’ and ‘imagine’ deliberately. Reconstructing 
a sequence of events and circumstances when solid evidence is so scarce requires 
imagination which crystalizes best in narrative plots. We can euphemistically call this 
‘surmise’ and ‘hypothesis’, but the process has more than one thing in common with 
fiction. Of course, the more prudent historian will steer clear of the temptation of such 
reckless reconstructions and venture into few, if any, conjectural statements. This is, no 
doubt, the most reasonable approach, but preferring fiction to reason, I took the liberty of 
spinning my yawn.  
 
Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi 
Dating Dharmakīrti’s death 30 years earlier than the Frauwallnerian theory also impacts 
the chronology of his followers. The dates of his direct disciple Devendrabuddhi, placed 
by Frauwallner 1982 [1961], 867) between 630 and 690, should thus be revised to c. 600-
670.66 Similarly, Śākyabuddhi’s dates, set by Frauwallner (ibid.) to c. 660-720, should 
be adjusted to 630-700.  
As for the post-Śākyabuddhi chronology, I simply don’t know how and how much 
of it should be altered. Only a careful and case-by-case consideration of all evidence, 
external and internal, can decide the matter.67  
                                               
65 PVSV is the siglum for Pramāṇavārttika Autocommentary (Gnoli ed.).  
66 On Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Tshad ma rnam ʼgrel gyi ʼgrel pa), see Frauwallner 
1982 [1960].  
67 The new dating proposed here makes it necessary to tweak the chronology of Dignāga’s opponents 
(something which I am not prepared to undertake). A convenient table of the philosophers and/or 
works which are criticised by Dignāga is found at Steinkellner 2017, 215 (Appendix 2).  
The hypothesis placing Dharmakīrti to c. 570-640 may also affect the dating of Candrakīrti and 
other authors, Buddhists or not, currently believed to have lived in the early and mid-7th century. The 
dating of Candrakīrti in particular seems closely connected to Dharmakīrti whose works he does not 
cite. On the other hand, the Madhyamaka philosopher shows familiarity with Dignāga (see Lang and 
Eltschinger 2019, 125; Seyfort Ruegg 2010 [1982], 23). On the basis of this detail, ‘the date most 
commonly accepted for Candrakīrti is 600-650’ (Lang and Eltschinger 2019, 125, referring to Seyfort 




In Lieu of Conclusion  
To make Procrustes’s work easier, here are the main conclusions hypothesised in this 
essay, some of them rather bold, others pretty modest or unchanged from the widely 
adopted dating. It goes without saying that the rounded off figures simply reflect our 
ignorance regarding concrete dates. All of them should therefore be understand as ‘circa’:  
          
・Vasubandhu 350-430  
・Dignāga 430-500  
・Sthiramati (the younger) 480-550   
・Bhāviveka 500-570  
・Dharmapāla 530-561  
・Dharmakīrti 570-640  
・Devendrabuddhi 600-670  
・Śākyabuddhi 630-700  
 
I’m the first one to admit that my arguments are highly conjectural and definitely 
open to re-revisitation. I am also aware that a 50- or 30-year adjustment means something 
only as long as the rigorous (German-style!) reconstruction of timelines is deemed the top 
priority for a historian. No doubt, getting as accurate as it gets is a ‘must’ for the 
chronology of political, socio-economical, and military events.  
I wonder, however, if the history of ideas should always stick to dating along 
rocket-science lines. When historical evidence is in short supply, approximating the 
sequences of philosophers, works, and their interactions may be as effective as the 
precision-aiming tweaking of chronologies. After all, Frauwallner’s theory did, does, and 
most probably will continue to function as a viable hypothesis without bringing any big, 
if any, changes to the larger picture of the Indian philosophy.68  
                                               
should be automatically reflected on the dating of Candrakīrti, who is generally regarded as the 
logician’s contemporary. If there are no other clues, then the Madhyamaka philosopher’s dates should 
also be adjusted to c. 570-640 (presupposing he enjoyed an average lifespan). At any rate, I conjecture 
that the reason for Candrakīrti’s lack of familiarity with Dharmakīrti (supposing they were 
contemporaries) is similar to the one behind Xuanzang’s silence, i.e. the poor and slow circulation of 
the logician’s works.  
Needless to say, any adjustments to the dates of the authors and works connected to the chronology 
discussed here should be done on a case-by-case basis. This will have the additional benefit of testing 
my hypotheses. If the assessment of the timelines of other authors and works yields sufficient evidence 
pointing to the untenability of my dating, the chronology will have to be re-re-visited and re-revised.  
68  In a very recent contribution, Eltschinger maintains, for example, that ‘Dignāga’s dates are 
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So, yeah, if we adopt a more laidback (say, Californian?) approach to chronology, 
430-500 vs 480-540 ain’t such a biggie. And if we take an even looser (Romanian?) view 
on history, all you need to know is that Dignāga lived in the 5th or 6th century and was a 
damn good philosopher, one of India’s finest.  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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Traditional Sources and Abbreviations  
Atharvaveda (Roth and Whitney ed.)  
Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara ed.)  
Chos-B: Bu-ston’s Chos ’byung (Chandra ed.)  
Chos-T: Tāranātha’s rGya gar chos ’byung (Schiefner ed.)  
Dacien-si Sanzang fashi zhuan 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳 (T 51, No. 2053)  
Da Tang Xiyu ji 大唐西域記 (T 51, No. 2087)  
Dhvanyāloka (Rai ed.)  
Lidai sanbao ji 歴代三寶紀 (T 49, No. 2034) 
Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan 南海寄歸内法傳 (T 54, No. 2125)  
Posoupandou fashi zhuan (Biography of Dharmācārya Vasubandhu) 婆薮槃豆法師傳, 
translated by Paramārtha 眞諦 (T 50, No. 2049)  
Pramāṇasamuccaya (Hattori ed.)  
Pramāṇavārttika (Miyaska ed.)  
Pramāṇavārttika Autocommentary [to Chapter One] (Gnoli ed.)  
T: Chinese Tripiṭaka Taishō ed. 大正大藏經  
Triṃśikā (Buescher ed.)   
Vākyapadīya (Rau ed.)  
Xu gao seng zhuan 續高僧傳 (T.50, No. 2060)  
 
 
                                               
reasonably well established’ (2019b, 179), referring to the theories of Frauwallner (1982 [1961]) and 
Hattori (1968) who place the logician between 470/80 and 530/40.  
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